Serious and Organised Crime and Livelihoods Programmes by Schultze-Kraft, Markus
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons 
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an 
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-
based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other 
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please 
contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
Serious and organised crime and 
livelihoods programmes 
Markus Schultze-Kraft 
International development and organised crime expert 
8 October 2018 
Questions 
1. What types of alternative livelihoods/development programmes that address serious and 
organised crime exist in developing countries, what interventions do they use and what 
outcomes do they seek to achieve? 
2. What does the evidence say about how effective these programmes are? 
Contents 
1. Summary of main findings 
2. Programmes focused on rural populations engaged in illicit drug crop farming 
3. Programmes focused on rural populations engaged or at risk of engaging in wildlife crime 
4. Programmes focused on populations engaged or at risk of engaging in piracy 
5. Programmes focused on violence prevention and reduction among urban youth gangs 
engaged in a range of criminal activities 
6. Evidence gaps 
7. References 
  
  
2 
1. Summary of main findings 
 
Tackling the effects of serious and organised crime (SOC) on development is not an area that 
traditionally has received much attention from the international aid community. Arguably, the 
issue only moved onto the mainstream development agenda with the publication of the World 
Development Report 2011, facilitating its cross-cutting inclusion in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (Reitano and Hunter 2018). This notwithstanding, development work in relation to SOC 
remains incipient and the field is still being scouted. Among the reasons for this is that the 
phenomenon of SOC defies clear definition and categorisation (Schultze-Kraft 2016). For the 
most part, SOC has been framed as a security problem for states, not a development issue. 
Consequently, policy responses – mostly by governments and multilateral organisations, but 
sometimes also by civic groups taking justice and armed defence against SOC into their own 
hands - have focused on law enforcement against, and criminal prosecution and incarceration of, 
members of crime structures and networks. The evidence on the relationship between SOC and 
alternative development or livelihoods programmes, and the effect of such programmes, is very 
limited.    
 
The literature search conducted for this Helpdesk report identified four principal areas of 
intervention pertaining to (a) alternative development and/or rural livelihoods/development 
promotion for drug crop producing communities, such as poppy farmers in Afghanistan, Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam, coca farmers in Colombia and cannabis growers in Morocco; (b) 
alternative livelihoods promotion for rural populations engaged in wildlife crime, such illegal 
hunting and poaching in Uganda and other sub-Saharan African countries; (c) alternative 
livelihoods promotion for populations at risk of engaging in piracy, particularly in coastal areas in 
Somalia; and (d) gang violence reduction and citizen security enhancement, such as the so-
called ‘second-generation’ violence prevention and reduction interventions in several Central 
American states, as well as in Liberia and Afghanistan. The search did not produce any evidence 
of the existence of policies and programmes that would seek to tackle illegal drug production 
(processing and refining of plant-based or synthetic illegal drugs), drug trafficking, human 
trafficking and smuggling, illegal organ trade, gun running and cybercrime, among other types of 
SOC, by means of alternative livelihoods programmes. 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of the identified interventions, the general picture is one of limited 
and/or lacking evidence. With respect to programmes geared at promoting alternative 
development, alternative livelihoods and rural development in drug crop producing 
regions in the developing world, the lack of solid evidence on effectiveness is related to the 
politically, socially, ideologically and culturally contested nature of current drug policies. Even in 
the cases of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, which are generally heralded as successful examples 
of suppressing opium poppy farming and heroin production, there is no evidence that AD and the 
promotion of alternative livelihoods has been the main factor contributing to the reduction of, if 
not an end to, the illicit opium economy. At a very general level, what can be said is that any 
effectiveness of AD and alternative livelihoods interventions in drug crop producing regions 
depends on the political, socioeconomic, security and cultural contexts, the type of illicit drug 
involved and the combination and sequencing of counter-drug enforcement, including (forced) 
eradication of drug crops, and AD or alternative livelihoods policies. There is no strong evidence 
that reducing the price differential between illicit and licit crops, with the former usually 
outcompeting the latter by a wide margin, is enough to incentivise rural populations to cease 
farming illicit crops. Based on research in Afghanistan and Myanmar, alternative development 
programming unlinked to broader state-building initiatives is bound to fail. What is more, 
alternative development/livelihoods programmes in drug crop producing countries can have 
negative effects. In Afghanistan, for instance, the increased production of staples or high value 
horticulture, have marginalised the land-poor, leading to changes in land tenure arrangements, 
the migration of vulnerable groups and the concentration of drug production in more remote and 
insecure regions.  
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Regarding wildlife crime in central and eastern Africa, there is limited evidence on (a) what 
causes and drives wildlife crime and (b) what can be achieved with interventions geared at 
promoting alternative livelihoods among rural populations engaged in or at risk of engaging in 
wildlife crime. General observations on the effectiveness of interventions geared at address in 
wildlife crime through alternative livelihoods projects include:  
 
 Building on traditional uses, practices, rules and governance institutions can enhance 
effectiveness where these are perceived as legitimate and equitable by community 
members. Livelihood options and ways to benefit from wildlife need to be chosen by 
community members themselves in accordance with their cultural and socio-economic 
values, and not imposed by external actors;  
 
 Community members need realistic incentives to support and actively engage in 
conservation, including anti-poaching. Rights and benefits are both important, though 
each may be inadequate alone;  
 
 Establishing clear, secure and enforceable rights (including land tenure) for communities 
to sustainably use, manage and benefit from conservation and wildlife is a fundamental 
basis for effective community-based wildlife management. Communities need help in 
securing the transfer of, and respect for, land and resource rights at the national level;  
 
 Effective community governance requires clarity on who constitutes the community doing 
the managing. Legitimate institutions need to be developed within and by these 
communities to ensure equitable benefit sharing and effective resource management, 
based on respect for legitimate traditional institutions where these exist; 
 
 Communities need greater voice in decision-making as well as in the development of 
policies that affect them. This applies at every level, from local to global. 
 
With respect to piracy in the Horn of Africa, there is no systematic evidence on the 
effectiveness of programmes geared at promoting alternative livelihoods for coastal populations, 
especially unemployed youth, formerly engaged or at risk of engaging in piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. The little there is in terms of programme evaluation is centred on monitoring outputs but 
not establishing outcomes or impact. 
 
Finally, regarding interventions aimed at curbing urban gang violence in Central America and 
countries such as Liberia and Afghanistan the evidence base is again very limited. There is 
no solid evidence on the effectiveness of ‘second-generation’ interventions to curb urban gang 
violence in Central America. Although they have been credited with some modest successes, 
such as the establishment of ‘peace zones’ in San Salvador, which were negotiated between the 
government and gang leaders and brought a temporary decrease in homicides, more preventive 
second-generation interventions seem to have yielded more rhetorical advances than meaningful 
reductions in gang violence. There have been very few rigorous evaluations of alternative 
livelihoods-focused interventions in other fragile and violence and crime-affected developing 
countries. Studies from Liberia and Afghanistan have found that pairing skills development 
programs with cash may be more effective than skills training alone, and may lead to limited 
reductions in criminal and violent activity. However, the effects are modest, and while well-
targeted vocational programs may be able to produce some reduction in criminal or violent 
activities, it is extremely difficult to get people to exit these activities entirely.   
Methodology 
This Helpdesk report is based on an online literature search, including keyword searches in 
academic journal indexes (Taylor and Francis, Science Direct, Springer, SAGE and Wiley Online 
Library) and Google and Google Scholar. The search has been oriented toward identifying 
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scholarly and grey literature sources that address alternative development/livelihoods 
programmes geared at tackling organised and serious crime issues in developing countries. The 
search terms included: “alternative livelihoods AND organised crime”; “alternative livelihoods 
AND “criminal networks”; “alternative livelihoods” AND “wildlife crime”; “alternative livelihoods 
AND piracy”; “alternative livelihoods” AND “urban gangs”; "alternative development" AND 
"country name"; "alternative development" AND "drugs policies"; "alternative livelihoods" AND 
"country name"; "alternative livelihoods" AND "drugs policies"; "illicit crops" AND "economy in 
country name". The search was informed by the author’s expert knowledge on some of the 
current debates on the topic.1 It sought to identify recent research, i.e. works published in the 
past five years (only one older paper dating back to 2009 has been included), on (a) types of 
alternative livelihoods/development programmes that address serious and organised crime in 
developing countries, what interventions are used and what outcomes are sought, and (b) the 
evidence about how effective these programmes are. The report focuses on countries and 
regions of primary interest to the UK Government and DFID. References to recent research on 
alternative development/livelihoods programmes in other regions, especially Latin America, were 
deliberately minimised. This Helpdesk report is not a full systematic review of the available 
evidence.  
2. Programmes focused on rural populations engaged in 
illicit drug crop farming  
Efforts to provide drug crop farmers in source countries with alternative, licit sources of income 
have been part of drug control policies since the 1960s. Originally, alternative development (AD) 
was framed in the rather limited way of ‘crop substitution’. This means that the farming of crops, 
such as coca and cannabis bush and opium poppies, which are used to produce plant-based 
drugs scheduled as prohibited substances in the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs,2 including cocaine, cannabis resin and heroin, must be substituted for by licit 
crops like coffee or cereals. Starting in the 1990s, the concept of AD evolved to include a broader 
focus on rural development in drug crop producing areas and the generation and protection of 
alternative livelihoods for rural communities (Buxton 2015). In the terminology of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the official drug control community, alternative 
development is a lawful, viable and sustainable alternative to illicit cultivation of drug crops. 
Interventions are considered sustainable when they are economically viable, with practical 
business plans, ecologically sound, socially just, culturally and anthropologically appropriate, and 
                                                   
1 Dr Schultze-Kraft has published extensively on drug and crime policy issues, including the reports ‘Organised 
crime, violence and development’ (http://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/organised-crime-violence-development/), ‘Getting 
high on impact:  the challenge of evaluating drug policy’ 
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301868860_Getting_high_on_impact_The_challenge_of_evaluating_dr
ug_policy), ‘Evolution of estimated coca cultivation and cocaine production in South America (Bolivia, Colombia 
and Peru) and of the actors, modalities and routes of cocaine trafficking to Europe’ 
(http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2373/downloads/EDMR2016%20Background%20paper_
Schulze-Kraft_Evolution%20of%20estimated%20coca%20cultivation%20and%20cocaine%20production.pdf), 
‘Getting real about an illicit external stressor: transnational cocaine trafficking through West Africa’ 
(https://www.eldis.org/document/A68398) and ‘Narcotráfico en América Latina: Un nuevo conseno internacional 
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/20647041?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents). 
 
 
 
2 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf 
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based on a scientific approach that incorporates the farmers in a people-centered approach 
(Schultze-Kraft and Befani 2014). 
Types and aims of interventions 
Broadly speaking, three types of AD programmes have been implemented by governments and 
multilateral and bilateral drug control and (some) development organisations in drug crop 
producing countries in Latin America (mostly coca in the Andes), Africa (mostly cannabis and 
khat) and South East Asia (mostly opium poppies):   
 Crop and income substitution: the longest-standing type of AD intervention dating back to 
the early 1960s, crop and income substitution seeks to directly replace illicit crops with 
alternative licit crops. This approach includes the implementation of different alternatives, 
such as promoting non-agricultural opportunities and enhancing the profit of alternative 
crops with certification schemes, among others (García Yi 2014; see also Buxton 2015, 
Schultze-Kraft and Befani 2014).  
 Integrated rural development (IRD): first adopted in the 1980s in countries like Thailand, 
Laos and Vietnam as well as Bolivia and Peru, IRD addresses a broad range of local 
social, economic, and environmental problems simultaneously. More of a ‘macro’ 
strategy than relatively limited crop and income substitution projects and geared at 
mainstreaming AD into national and regional rural development plans, the approach is 
expensive and  tends to require significant international staff and a large complement of 
local counterparts (García-Yi 2014; see also Buxton 2015).  
 Mainstream development: this approach seeks to embed drug control activities within 
regional and national level development programmes. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has nominally endorsed this approach for its AD 
interventions but in practice many of their efforts mostly continue to resemble crop and 
income substitute approaches (García-Yi 2014:75-76). 
Among the early AD interventions figure, for instance, a Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)-sponsored programme in the Riff region in Morocco implemented in 1960, in which “seeds 
and fertilizers were distributed to assist farmers to switch [from cannabis] to other crops, while 
studies were undertaken to convert kif [i.e. cannabis] cultivation to other crops, [ironically] also to 
tobacco (Blickman 2017:10). This was followed, in 1961, by the launch of the “United Nations 
and the FAO […] rural development programme, Développement Economique et Rural Du Rif 
Occidental (DERRO), which although not specifically targeting cannabis cultivation, was intended 
to develop the area and counter deforestation, erosion and migration” (Blickman 2017:10).  
In other regions, cases of AD programmes have included “several AD projects in Laos (i.e. the 
Shifting Cultivation Stabilization Pilot Project) and Thailand (i.e. the Royal Northern Project), 
which aimed at “development first and opium suppression second” (Windle 2018:371). In 
Vietnam, “development-oriented opium suppression projects were eventually mainstreamed into 
national development policy” (Windle 2018:371). In Afghanistan, the government with the 
financial and logistical backing from the UK and US governments introduced the Helmand Food 
Zone in 2008. “This initiative consisted of three activities: a counternarcotics information 
campaign aimed at deterring planting [of opium poppies], distribution of wheat sed and fertilizer, 
and eradication [of opium poppies]” (Mansfield 2018a). In the Andean region, where basically all 
of the world’s coca leaf is grown, the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) operated an 
organic coffee certification AD project. “The Promotion of Organic Coffee Cultivation and 
Marketing in Coca Regions Project (1994-2001) aimed to: […] help […] farmers in coca 
cultivation regions [who farmed both coca leaf and coffee, with the former crop achieving a 
consistently higher price on local markets than the latter] gradually to switch their coffee crops to 
organic coffee. It also advised them on processing and marketing the organic coffee, thus 
helping them to sustainably increase their income, and create a stable economic alternative to 
coca cultivation. The project operated in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the Cauca 
6 
regions of Colombia; in the Selva Central of Peru, and in the northern Yungas are of Bolivia” 
(García-Yi 2014:79). UNODC has also been active in supporting AD projects implemented by the 
governments of Peru, Colombia and Bolivia, including a project in the upper Tambopata valley in 
Peru, “one of [the country’s] most remote and difficult to access Amazon rainforest areas”, 
geared at replacing coca crops with alternative crops such as coffee (García-Yi 2014: 79-81).  
While intuitively appealing and representing what could be termed the ‘soft’ and ‘developmental’ 
side of drug supply control strategies, policies designed to support alternative development and 
livelihoods have not escaped the wider controversy over the ultimate goals of drug policy and the 
theories of change that underpin interventions (Schultze-Kraft and Befani 2014). At the heart of 
the problem is that AD and alternative livelihoods programmes in drug crop producing regions 
are conceived as being part of the broader international counter-narcotics effort geared at 
suppressing the illegal production, trade and use of substances scheduled as illegal and harmful 
in the 1961 UN Convention against Narcotic Drugs. Promoting AD is therefore not primarily 
aimed at improving the livelihoods of impoverished rural populations but is rather seen as 
necessary to curb the production of prohibited plant-based psychotropic substances. In this 
respect, British drug policy expert David Mansfield, who is known for his empirical work in 
Afghanistan, observes that “the change model that underpins alternative development is […] far 
from clear with many development donors perceiving it as intimately tied to coercive measures 
such as eradication and efforts to make development assistance contingent on reductions in drug 
crop cultivation, so called ‘conditionality.’ In Afghanistan, many development donors, such as 
DFID, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) argued such an approach would be counterproductive; [even] USAID, 
[which is not known for being critical of making alternative development/livelihoods promotion aid 
contingent on the prior eradication of illicit crops] went as far as to say it would be “self-defeating” 
(Mansfield 2018: 158).  
“There is a need to move away”, continues Mansfield, “from what are often rather economic 
reductionist understandings of drug crop cultivation and develop a much deeper understanding of 
those who cultivate and trade illegal drug crops and how they shaped and are shaped by the 
political economy of the places they inhabit. […] It is also important to recognise the different 
roles these crops play in the household economy and how this impacts on the allocation of both 
labour and land. [….] The result is that for the vast majority of farmers in Afghanistan, wheat is a 
staple and not a cash crop [such as opium poppies – or coca leaf and organic certified coffee in 
Peru], and as such the presentation of the gross returns (or even the net returns) on the two 
crops is misleading. For most farmers, an increase in the price of wheat does not result in a shift 
to commercial wheat production, even if the net returns on wheat production surpass those of 
opium. Instead, high wheat prices are seen by farmers as bringing about an increase in the cost 
of food that needs to be managed by the household. This is especially the case where there are 
concerns over wheat imports from neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, and where violence 
and conflict make it difficult to travel and purchase wheat at the local market (Mansfield 
2018:163-164). 
Effectiveness 
Owing to insufficient evidence and the politically, socially and ideologically contested nature of 
current drug policies, there is no consensus on the effectiveness of programmes that aim at 
promoting AD, alternative livelihoods and rural development in drug crop producing regions 
(Schultze-Kraft and Befani 2014). This is borne out in the research on AD and alternative 
livelihoods interventions in drug crop producing countries as varied as Afghanistan (Mansfield 
2018), Morocco (Blickman 2017), Peru (García-Yi), Colombia (Rincón-Ruíz 2016), Kenya, 
Nigeria and Lesotho (Carrier and Klantschnig 2016). Even in the cases of Thailand, Laos and 
Vietnam, which are generally heralded as successful examples of suppressing opium poppy 
farming and heroin production, there is no evidence that AD and the promotion of alternative 
livelihoods has been the main factor contributing to the reduction of, if not an end to, the illicit 
opium economy. In general terms, what can be said is that any effectiveness of AD and 
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alternative livelihoods interventions in drug crop producing regions depends on the political, 
socioeconomic, security and cultural contexts, the type of illicit drug involved and the combination 
and sequencing of counter-drug enforcement, including (forced) eradication of drug crops, and 
AD or alternative livelihoods policies. There is no strong evidence that reducing the price 
differential between illicit and licit crops, with the former usually outcompeting the latter by a wide 
margin, is enough to incentivise rural populations to cease farming illicit crops (García-Yi 2014; 
Mansfield 2018; Windle 2018).  
In this regard, Windle observes that Thailand is “one of a small handful of countries to have 
largely stopped farmers from growing opium. After decades of cultivation, Thailand succeeded—
after initial policy experimentation and false moves—in suppressing production in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s through a policy centered primarily on alternative development, which 
addressed the structural drivers of opium farming. Alternative development was supported by law 
enforcement (primarily negotiated eradication) and sequenced after state extension [i.e. 
establishing and/or expanding the presence and basic service reach of the state in remote rural 
areas] and the resolution of the highland insurgency. […] Thailand’s success boils down to the 
establishment of state authority in formerly isolated areas and the extension of incentives to 
farmers, followed by the creation of a high-risk environment for illicit drug crop cultivation and 
production” (Windle 2016:8-9; see also Anderson 2017). Therefore, “the Thai intervention was 
essentially one of ‘state extension through the administration of development-orientated projects 
into isolated highland areas of Northern Thailand. […] After identifying the limitations of more 
coercive approaches, eradication and law enforcement were sequenced after the state had 
increased its authority in opium farming areas” (Windle 2018: 371).  
Highlighting the lack of evidence that opium poppy farming was primarily rolled-back because of 
the promotion of substitute licit crops, Anderson notes that “historical success of alternative 
development in Northern Thailand and finds that opium poppy cultivation was not drastically 
reduced because substitute crops earned the same income as opium: nothing can equal the 
price of opium to smallholder farmers, especially those without land tenure and the consecutive 
inability to securely invest in longer-term crops. The near-total reduction in opium cultivation, 
however, was aided by much more than new crops and price guarantees. […] These findings 
[from northern Thailand] indicate that alternative development programming unlinked to broader 
state-building initiatives in Afghanistan, Myanmar and other opium poppy-producing areas will 
fail, because short-term, high-yield, high value, imperishable opium will remain the most logical 
choice for poor farmers, especially given the lack of a farmer’s vested interest in the state which 
compels them to reduce their income whilst offering them no other protections or services” 
(Anderson 2017:48-49). 
These findings are confirmed by research in other south-east and south Asian countries, such as 
Laos, Vietnam and Afghanistan. According to Windle, “state extension was a stated objective in 
several alternative development projects in Laos, including the Palavek Alternative Development 
Project, the Xieng Khouang Highland Development Programme and Nonghet Alternative 
Development Project Programme. Furthermore, both Laos and Vietnam used opium suppression 
as a justification for expanding existing policies designed to further assimilate highland minorities 
within the dominant lowland culture and politics, including the dovetailing of opium suppression 
with resettlement of highland peoples into lowland areas. For example, a 1994 Laotian policy to 
resettle 60% of highlanders into new or existing lowland villages was justified by parallel 
objectives of extending the state into formerly isolated areas and, reducing poverty and opium 
production” (Windle 2018:370-71).  
In Afghanistan, writes Mansfield, “it has not been unusual to hear the argument from 
development donors and practitioners, such as USAID and its contractors that any support to 
legal on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income will lead to a contraction of the illegal economy, or 
at least provide an increased portfolio of legal options that farmers can pursue. [However], in 
practice both illegal drug crop cultivation and the legal economy can grow in parallel and it is not 
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uncommon for investments in physical infrastructure such as irrigation, and agricultural inputs 
such as fertiliser to be used to increase the amount of land under opium poppy and its yields. 
Other interventions, some of them ostensibly designed to deliver development outcomes, such 
as the increased production of staples or high value horticulture, have marginalised the land-
poor, leading to changes in land tenure arrangements, the migration of vulnerable groups and 
the concentration of drug production in more remote and insecure regions” (Mansfield 2018:158).  
Furthermore, “there are many examples of alternative development, particularly in Afghanistan, 
where the strategic focus of the programme has been to provide largesse and political favour to 
elites so that they will in turn coerce the rural population to abandon or reduce opium poppy 
cultivation.3 The kind of pro-poor development outcomes that donors like DFID or the World Bank 
might support are lost, or merely an externality of a programme primarily designed to leverage 
reductions in levels of opium poppy cultivation, much of which is only short lived (Mansfield 
2018:158) 
3. Programmes focused on rural populations engaged or at 
risk of engaging in wildlife crime 
Wildlife crime has been defined as “any harm to (or intent to harm or subsequent trade of) non-
domesticated wild animals, plants and fungi, in contravention of national and international laws 
and conventions” (Harrison et al. 2015). In recent years, this illegal activity has become an issue 
of considerable and growing international concern (see Harrison et al. 2015; Biggs et al. 2017; 
Duffy et al. 2016). In this respect, it has been observed that the “increase in awareness [of 
wildlife crime] is partly due to the recent and rapid rise in illegal wildlife trade [IWT], and partly 
because of the increasing militarisation with which wildlife crime is carried out in some high-
profile areas, such as the poaching of elephants for ivory and rhinos for horn in Central and 
Eastern Africa. While poverty is often cited as a driver of wildlife crime, this is not necessarily 
true. Additionally, wildlife crime can have negative impacts on poor people, either because their 
natural resource base is being depleted, or through insecurity introduced by wildlife criminals. 
Responses to wildlife crime can also have disproportionate impacts on local people, who can be 
easy targets for law enforcement agencies. However, there is a dearth of evidence in the 
literature which would enable the relationships between poverty and wildlife crime to be 
empirically assessed” (Harrison et al. 2015:8). 
Typical policy responses to wildlife crime have been increasing the costs associated with 
engaging in it, mostly through state-led and/or private law enforcement. However, “top down (and 
particularly militarized) enforcement strategies frequently not only change the costs of engaging 
in IWT but can produce a range of other (sometimes unanticipated) impacts that can collectively 
undermine conservation incentives. Where enforcement efforts are upholding local rights, 
providing security and/or defending a community’s assets they will strengthen community 
benefits from conservation and may well increase support for it. But poorly directed or heavy-
handed efforts can impose unjustified restrictions on people’s use of wildlife resources, infringe 
rights, and undermine the benefits that local people can gain from conservation and wildlife 
protection. Interventions justified by cracking down on IWT can, for example, curtail livelihood 
benefits from legitimate use of wildlife through subsistence use, trade, or trophy hunting 
programmes. Heavy-handed enforcement can further involve unjust persecution, harassment 
                                                   
3 ‘Largesse’ refers to the disbursement of large amounts of agricultural and alternative development funding in 
drug crop producing countries. In Afghanistan, for instance, “between FY 2002 and FY 2012 USAID provided 
approximately $2.46 billion for agricultural and alternative development funding to improve production, increase 
access to markets, and provide alternatives to poppy cultivation.673 Of that, USAID has obligated and disbursed 
$54 million in direct assistance to build capacity at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) 
(SIGAR 2014:169). 
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and human rights abuses by authorities, increasing the perceived costs of living alongside 
wildlife” (Cooney et al. 2017:371-72). 
Given the shortcomings and risks associated with (militarised) law enforcement responses to 
wildlife crime, an alternative strategy is providing ‘alternative livelihoods’ for local communities. 
“The most commonly cited rationale for these interventions is that by providing an alternative 
source of income they reduce dependence on income from IWT. In some cases, the ability to 
benefit from alternative livelihoods interventions is made conditional on wildlife conservation. In 
these cases, the interventions serve to increase the costs of engaging in IWT. However, the 
evidence for the effectiveness of alternative livelihoods approaches (in terms of delivering 
conservation outcomes) is scant. In particular, it is unclear if the provision of benefits from 
alternative livelihoods interventions replaces or simply supplements IWT benefits. There are 
some examples in which alternative livelihoods have been used as one component of a package 
of interventions to tackle IWT or where ‘reformed poachers associations’ have been established 
on the premise of provision of alternative sources of income-earning opportunities (Duffy et al. 
2016:370-71).  
Types and aims of interventions 
Creating alternative sources of income is a strategy advocated to reduce local engagement in 
IWT. For example, “in the Ruvuma Elephant Project implemented by the PAMs Foundation, local 
people are supported to grow chillies that not only act as a deterrent for elephants and so help 
reduce human– wildlife conflict but also provide an income-generating opportunity through the 
development of small enterprises selling chili jam. Such alternative-livelihood interventions are 
focused on reducing livelihood dependency on wildlife (also known as decoupling). A wide 
variety of such interventions have been used in conservation initiatives, including tailoring and 
barbering, rickshaw pulling, and bicycle repairing. The intended output is that the community has 
a greater diversity of livelihood options. The anticipated outcomes are that communities depend 
less on wildlife as a source of revenue and so have less need to poach. However, the evidence 
base for the effectiveness of such alternative-livelihood interventions is patchy and weak” (Biggs 
et al. 2017:9). According to Dilys Roe et al. (2014), among the reasons for this lack of evidence 
about the effectiveness of alternative livelihoods projects in relation to wildlife crime is that “their 
objectives vary a great deal, and there is no single accepted definition of what constitutes an 
alternative livelihood project. In addition, very little is known about what impacts, if any, 
alternative livelihoods projects have had on biodiversity conservation, as well as what determines 
the success or failure of these interventions” (Roe et al. 2014:1). 
This evidence gap notwithstanding, it is held that it is important to engage rural communities that 
neighbour or live with wildlife as key partners in tackling IWT. While a framework to guide such 
community engagement is lacking, a key assumption is that “the communities that are close to 
wildlife are key to combating IWT. By virtue of their proximity to and knowledge of wildlife, they 
are well placed to participate in and support IWT. The same characteristics mean, however, that 
they are equally well placed to detect, report on, and help prevent IWT. Such communities are 
diverse. Socioeconomic, political, legal, and environmental factors influence the nature of 
interactions with wildlife; hence, perceptions of and attitudes toward IWT differ (Biggs et al. 
2015). These differences affect the types of community-engagement interventions that are likely 
to be effective” (Biggs et al. 2017:6-7). 
However, “current understanding of illegal hunting is hampered by a lack of data. Moreover, it is 
frequently approached primarily as a conservation concern rather than an issue of poverty and 
development. Yet, the argument that it results from poverty is widely used” (Duffy et al.:16). It is 
therefore important to “move on from this characterization and recognize the complexities of 
motivations and political-economic contexts so that illegal wildlife hunting can be addressed in a 
more effective, socially and environmentally just manner. […] Illegal wildlife hunting may not 
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simply be a way of averting want and deprivation, it may be a means of seeking and affirming 
identity, status, lifeways, custom, and local prestige” (Duffy et al. 2016:16). 
Examples of recent efforts aimed at promoting alternative livelihoods for rural populations 
engaged or at risk of engaging in wildlife crime in several African countries include the 
interventions implemented by the Uganda Wildlife Authority and other organisations in Uganda 
(Harrison et al. 2015) and a ten-year programme (2010-2020) of the German Federal Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) geared at protecting biodiversity in the Kavango 
Zambezi (KAZA) region spanning five southern African countries, Tanzania (Serengeti and the 
Selous national parks) and Central Africa. 
The interventions in Uganda combine law enforcement with regulated resource access, revenue 
sharing from tourism and sport hunting, the establishment of reformed poachers’ associations 
and conservation education (Harrison et al. 2015). Based on an assessment of the socio-
economic enabling factors and the technicalities of ivory and rhino horn trafficking, the BMZ 
programme, which is implemented by GIZ, identifies the following areas of strategic intervention 
were identified (Global Initiative Against Organised Crime/ SWP 2014):  
• Strengthen and support the national capacity for management and governance of the protected 
areas, including through the use of technology; 
• Provide alternative livelihoods and incentives for local communities to engage in preventing 
poaching; 
• Work across borders to ensure a uniform and collaborative approach to protect the 
conservation areas; 
• Build the capacity of a range of security actors, from wardens to law enforcement, the police 
and the judiciary; 
• Address corruption facilitating the poaching and transportation of illegally sourced 
environmental commodities; 
• Raise awareness and attempt to address demand in the main market countries in Asia 
consuming ivory and rhino products, based on analysis of the factors driving demand; 
• Support international cooperation and dialogue between the affected African and Asian 
countries. 
Effectiveness 
Overall, there is limited evidence on (a) what causes and drives wildlife crime and (b) what can 
be achieved with interventions geared at promoting alternative livelihoods among rural 
populations engaged in or at risk of engaging in wildlife crime. According to Cooney et al. (2017), 
“so-called “alternative livelihood” initiatives are often deployed as a mechanism to reduce 
unsustainable and/or illegal use of wildlife by indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs). 
However, the evidence-base for the effectiveness of these initiatives is very limited. Many suffer 
from poor design, and outcomes can even undermine conservation in the long term” (Cooney et 
al. 2018:10). Among the pitfalls Rosie Cooney et al. identify in this respect is “elite capture (the 
inequitable capture of benefits by more powerful individuals) [of alternative livelihoods 
programmes], which is a constant threat that can undermine the potential engagement of the 
community as a whole. Communities are made up of individuals with different priorities and 
motivations, and interventions need to understand these in order to target the right people. 
Including women as direct beneficiaries and key stewards of natural resources is critical” 
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(Cooney et al. 2018:10). Based on a review of the extant literature,4 the authors offer the 
following insights for policy:   
 “Building on traditional uses, practices, rules and governance institutions can enhance 
effectiveness where these are perceived as legitimate and equitable by community 
members. Livelihood options and ways to benefit from wildlife need to be chosen by 
community members themselves in accordance with their cultural and socio-economic 
values, and not imposed by external actors. This also applies to enforcement 
interventions – these will be more effective where they are “co-created”, i.e. where 
communities have a say in the setting of rules and penalties for breaking them, where 
traditional authorities are respected, and relations of trust between the enforcement 
authorities and communities have been built. Effective enforcement engaged 
communities: two sides of the same coin. Effective enforcement against ITW and 
community engagement can – and should – be mutually reinforcing. In any setting, good 
enforcement relies critically on support from communities, particularly through the 
provision of intelligence. On the other hand, communities need strong and reliable 
backup when their interests or resources are threatened, and it would endanger them to 
combat such threats themselves. Currently, however, enforcement is often poorly 
targeted and ineffective. It is often focused on communities and individuals who gain only 
a tiny fraction of the profits from ITW, are battling acute subsistence needs, and who are 
unaware of the extent or impact of ITW, while “kingpins” or other powerful players go 
unpunished. 
 Community members need realistic incentives to support and actively engage in 
conservation, including anti-poaching. Rights and benefits are both important, though 
each may be inadequate alone. Empowerment of communities to manage their own 
resources through strengthened land and resource rights can be a strong motivating 
force. The overall benefits from conservation need to outweigh the costs of conserving it. 
This is particularly challenging given the high payoffs (to a few) of high-value ITW. 
Although benefits need not necessarily be financial, where people are facing acute 
subsistence needs – or where living with wildlife imposes significant costs – financial 
incentives may be critical. 
 Establishing clear, secure and enforceable rights (including land tenure) for communities 
to sustainably use, manage and benefit from conservation and wildlife is a fundamental 
basis for effective community-based wildlife management. Communities need help and 
support in securing the transfer of, and respect for, land and resource rights at the 
national level. International restrictions imposed via multilateral agreements or import 
restrictions should be based on very careful consideration of how these will affect 
community wildlife management at the local level. Policies often ignore the benefits of 
                                                   
4 “The review first addresses the large and well-established body of literature on community-based approaches to 
wildlife management, covering three decades of experience in this field, and draws out key lessons learned and 
best practices. However, the recent upsurge of high-value ITW has brought new dynamics and implications for 
conservation. The review therefore goes on to consider the limited literature in recent years specifically 
addressing community involvement in tackling ITW in the context of the current “crisis”. The lessons from this 
experience, particularly on the factors that facilitate or constrain effective CWM, are highly relevant to the current 
debate on ITW. Yet, these lessons appear to have been overlooked in the urgency to find quick-fix solutions to a 
complex problem. Indeed, the three decades of literature on CWM is remarkably consistent in the lessons it 
highlights and the policy prescriptions it provides. This begs the question as to why these lessons are not being 
heeded. The answer may lie in the political nature of conservation and in the power of the vested interests that 
benefit from maintaining the status quo rather than embracing reform. UNEA could add value to the debate on 
communities and ITW not by reinventing the wheel and making recommendations that have been made 
numerous times before, but by encouraging Member States to take heed of the lessons already learned and seek 
to implement them. As one of the reports we review points out, “democracy and sustainability are two sides of the 
same coin” (Nelson, 2010). That is to say, the crucial political and governance reforms required for CWM are only 
likely to happen when communities are able to demand their rights. For this they need to be organized and 
mobilized, and enabled to have a “voice”” (Cooney et al. 2018:13-14). 
12 
using land for wildlife, and favour agricultural, extractive or other commercial 
development. This drives loss of wildlife and can restrict community rights and interests. 
 Effective community governance requires clarity on who constitutes the community doing 
the managing. Legitimate institutions need to be developed within and by these 
communities to ensure equitable benefit sharing and effective resource management, 
based on respect for legitimate traditional institutions where these exist. These power 
structures must be accountable to the community. Attention must be paid to 
understanding the diverse and heterogeneous groups within communities and how power 
and benefits are shared. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, communities need greater voice in decision-
making as well as in the development of policies that affect them. This applies at every 
level, from local to global. Despite well-established policy commitments on the 
importance of IPLCs in conserving wildlife, IPLCs have little or no influence in 
conservation and wildlife management decision-making at the national level. At 
international level their influence is highly variable – from well-integrated to virtually 
absent” (Cooney et al. 2018: 8-11) 
4. Programmes focused on populations engaged or at risk 
of engaging in piracy 
Piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Horn of Africa has become a major international concern 
since it started manifesting more prominently in the mid-2000s, when it was prompted by 
prowling and illegal fishing by foreign vessels. Over the years incidents of piracy increased with 
more youth joining in as in-flow of large amounts of cash began to pour in from activities that 
were assumed by young men as lucrative and profitable. Piracy is often seen as closely linked to 
poverty and high youth unemployment rates, especially in remoter coastal and adjacent 
hinterland districts of Somalia where piracy lords can hide and attract new recruits. In 2010, it 
was estimated that the cost of piracy to the international community ranged between US$4.9-
US$8.3 billion (UNDP 2015). Piracy has been a lucrative business but at the same time has 
brought about a host of negative socio-economic consequences, including increased sex-
workers, increased use of Khat and other narcotics which have led to increased crime and 
diseases, including increasing vulnerability to HIV Aids in coastal communities (UNDP 2015). 
In 2013, the number of reported incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia declined sharply, with 
a total of 17 attacks in the first 9 months, compared to 99 attacks in the same period during 2012 
(UNDP 2015). This is attributed to measures including improved international and regional 
cooperation on counter-piracy efforts. However, piracy remains a very real threat and ships are 
still unable to transit peacefully off the coast of Somalia. According to the UNDP Alternative 
Livelihoods to Piracy Somalia project (see below), this threat is likely to remain as long as local 
communities in coastal areas are unable to provide alternative livelihoods opportunities for 
unemployed youth. In effect, piracy activities have been shifting from one coastal area to another 
depending on the pressure exerted on pirates by the local authorities and communities as well as 
increased livelihood activities for youth in the areas abandoned by pirates. 
Types and aims of interventions 
Interventions geared at tackling piracy off the coast of Somalia through the building of alternative 
livelihoods for coastal populations (especially youth) formerly engaged or at risk of engaging in 
piracy have generally focused on promoting local economic development, job creation, vocation 
training and social rehabilitation. The underlying assumption of these projects is that vulnerable 
and poor coastal populations, especially unemployed youngsters, engage in piracy because of 
the socioeconomic hardship and poverty they experience. Among the projects that have been 
implemented in the past years in this area are the UNDP project Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy 
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in Somalia, a Norwegian Church Aid project on addressing piracy in Somalia and the joint 
UN/FAO/EU Coastal Communities against Piracy (CCAP) project.           
UNDP Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy in Somalia5: In 2013, UNDP Somalia and the Consortium 
of Shipping Industry Donor Companies jointly established a project intended to strengthen 
community resilience against piracy through local economic development, job creation and 
support for micro and small entrepreneurs - particularly youth and other vulnerable groups - in 
the piracy ‘hot spots’ of Puntland and Central Somalia. Implementation commenced in March 
2013 for a period of 18 months with a total budget of USD $1 Million. While these resources - 
coupled with additional funds from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office - are helping to 
combat piracy in Adado, Abudwak, Eyl, Gara’ad, Hafun, Bander Bayle and South Galkayo, there 
is considerable unmet demand for support to vulnerable communities, including youth at risk of 
becoming pirates - in other coastal areas of Puntland and Central Somalia.  
The intervention is focused on three districts: two in Puntland and one in the Central Region. The 
two in Puntland are Alola and Bargal, while the one in the Central Region is Balanbal and 
adjacent towns. All these areas were either piracy hot spots or have been heavily affected by 
piracy related activities and still remain vulnerable because of limited economic opportunities, 
high youth unemployment rates and poor infrastructure. The project aims to combat long-term 
unemployment in the target areas through the provision of social rehabilitation actions, 
employable skills training, entrepreneurship trainings, provision of in-kind micro grants to 
entrepreneurs, start-up tools to young people, and the rehabilitation of productive and social 
infrastructures through ‘cash for work’ schemes.  
Social rehabilitation activities are incorporated into this project in all three areas where target 
youth are given the opportunity to benefit from the rehabilitation program as part and parcel of a 
full-fledged economic empowerment program. Simultaneously with the social rehabilitation 
training, the target youth is engaged in the long-term employment program through the 
employable skills training program including various vocational skills and micro-business 
management training to help the beneficiaries set up their own micro-enterprises. 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) project6: Piracy has plagued the Puntland region of Somalia for 
many years starting from the mid-2000s, and those most affected have been unemployed young 
men who are most likely to be recruited into piracy. NCA, together with partner the Garowe 
Vocational Training Centre (GVTC), has sought to contribute to ending piracy by initiating the 
alternative livelihoods to piracy project, targeting this unemployed and uneducated group. 700 
youth who were former pirates, and who previously were engaged in piracy and youth at risk who 
had lost their livelihood (fishing) due to piracy along the coastal areas of Puntland, were targeted 
through this project during the period 2011-2014. 400 youths were enrolled into a 3 months 
vocational training at GVTC where they undertook training in masonry, electricity, carpentry etc. 
Another 300 youths were enrolled in business skills training for a period of one month. 
EU/FAO/Somalia7: In 2016, the Somali government, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the European Union (EU) launched a joint project to support coastal communities and 
                                                   
5 http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/operations/projects/hiv_aids/environment-and-natural-
resources-mangement-project111.html 
6 https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/3147be4c564d45c19290e7a9f12db86f/kirkens-nodhjelp-somalia-
results-one-pager-2015.pdf 
7 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-11/10/c_135818028.htm 
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help them wean off piracy. The project aims at promoting economic opportunities for young 
people living in coastal communities in north-eastern and central areas of Somalia. Under the 
Coastal Communities against Piracy (CCAP) project, hundreds of young residents are receiving 
training on using new fishing vessels, fish product processing, fodder production and others. 
According to the UN and the EU, creating long-term jobs for youth in fishing community is a key 
strategy for preventing piracy and reducing temptations to engage in maritime crime. The 
prevention and fight against piracy cannot be achieved just by strengthening regional 
coordination and capacity for maritime security, but instead must be supported by creating 
alternative livelihoods and economic opportunities for groups more at risk of engaging in illegal 
activities. 
The project builds on other FAO activities in the fisheries and livestock sectors, such as the 
deployment of FADs (Fishing Aggregating Devices) along Somalia’s coastline in 2015 and a boat 
building programme that is making low-cost, high quality, efficient and safe fishing boats 
available to fishing communities for the first time for many years. Almost 200 young people from 
coastal communities in Puntland, Galmudug and Mogadishu will benefit from the use of new 
fishing vessels and receive technical training to increase the catches, reduce costs and better 
manage vital marine resources. More than 200 young men and women will receive training and 
mentoring support in handling and processing of fish and fish products and management and 
operation of fish handling facilities. Over 75 youths will benefit from support in fodder production 
and another 440 youth will be involved in related cash-for-work activities. At the institutional level, 
18 individual fishing co-operatives and the Hibo Co-operative umbrella organization will benefit 
from a structured training and mentoring programme to improve their services to the fishing 
community. 
Effectiveness 
There is no systematic evidence on the effectiveness of the referenced programmes geared at 
promoting alternative livelihoods for coastal populations, especially unemployed youth, formerly 
engaged or at risk of engaging in piracy off the coast of Somalia. An evaluation of the Norwegian 
Church Aid project provides the following insights, which are, however, entirely focused on 
project output achievement, not impact.8   
 Alternative livelihood targeting piracy is embryonic and an innovative idea that NCA 
should seriously and consistently promote. The world all over is concerned and is in 
dilemma on how to combat the problem. NCA has come up with the none-violent strategy 
anchored on the religion which hitherto, although gradually, has proved its efficacy. More 
gains are expected as the stakeholders expand their coverage. 
 In collaboration between GVTC and a private company providing electricity to Garowe - 
the Nugal Electrical Company (NEC) and facilitated by NCA, a tailor-made electrician 
course curriculum was developed to ensure that what graduates learnt met the 
company’s labour demand. As a result of this, about 20 of the graduates from the 
electricity training at GVTC have been employed at NEC and currently there are 12 of 
them still working with NEC. After vocational training, 400 other students who were 
trained in other skills were given a start-up kit which contained the minimum tools 
required to help them set up their own enterprises. As confirmed by end of phase one 
ALP evaluation report, 60% of the vocational skills graduates i.e. those who did not go 
formal employment, have managed to start their own businesses in their area of 
expertise The business skills training (BST) graduates were given a start-up grant of 500 
                                                   
8 https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/ngo-
evaluations/somalia-programme-activities-in-gedo-puntland-and-mogadishu-final-report.pdf 
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USD and the evaluation report confirmed that 75% of the 300 BST graduates have 
started their own re-tail shops especially in Garowe IDP camps where there is large 
population who depend on shops to buy food. These youths are now useful members of 
Puntland society, who are now earning a decent income and taking care of their families 
and wider society. They earn an average of 150 USD per month from their businesses 
and this has kept them away from piracy and human trafficking business across the red 
sea which attract idle youths in Puntland. These youths are now not only able to support 
their families, but they are accepted and respected members of the community.  
5. Programmes focused on violence prevention and 
reduction among urban youth gangs engaged in a range 
of criminal activities 
In the past fifteen years, urban violence has become a major preoccupation of policymakers, 
planners and development practitioners in cities around the world. States routinely seek to 
contain such violence through repression, as well as through containment of crime at the 
periphery of metropolitan centres. Yet, urban violence is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon. 
Robust state-led responses tend to overlook and conceal the underlying factors shaping the 
emergence of urban violence, as well as the motivations and means of so-called violence 
entrepreneurs. Among the most notorious groups currently engaged in urban violence are the 
Central American gangs (locally known as pandillas and maras). In the last years, the type of 
urban violence committed by these groups has seen a qualitative transformation. Central 
America serves as a transit point for at least 80 percent of all cocaine shipments between the 
Andean region and North America. There is an increasing amount of evidence suggesting that 
the involvement of local gang members in drug trafficking and dealing is leading to both types of 
gangs evolving towards more violent behaviour patterns (Jütersonke et al. 2009). 
Government responses to gang violence and crime have transitioned from ‘iron fist’ law 
enforcement interventions in the 2000s to programmes that target ‘youth at risk’ by means of a 
range of policies not primarily focused on law enforcement, criminal prosecution and 
incarceration of gang members. “The opening salvo of the veritable ‘war on gangs’ underway in 
Central America was El Salvador’s adoption of a ‘Mano Dura’ (Iron Fist) policy in July 2003. A 
harbinger of repressive approaches to gang control, the Mano Dura approach advocated the 
immediate imprisonment (for up to five years) of youths as young as 12 who displayed gang-
related tattoos or flashed gang signs in public” (Jütersonke et al. 2009:13). However, these 
heavy-handed law and order policies did not prove effective and risked exacerbating gang 
violence and human rights violations. In Central America, “policing efforts that address social 
phenomena such as youth gangs and organised crime exclusively through violent repressive 
strategies do not work. In the best of cases, such strategies are not sustainable, merely 
displacing violence from one part of the city to another (Arévalo de León et al. 2016).  
Community-oriented policing approaches to crime and violence generally have not generally 
been shown to be effective in reducing criminal activity, although they may improve public 
perceptions of the police. One challenge of evaluating these approaches is that they vary widely 
in approach. A 2015 review of 25 studies on community-oriented policing found no effects on 
crime and violence, but improved public perceptions regarding police performance and disorder 
(Gill et al. 2014).  Evaluations from the US of hot spots policing—concentrating police presence 
in areas with higher levels of crime—have shown some effectiveness in reducing crime, but there 
are questions about the extent to which these interventions simply displace crime elsewhere. A 
2018 randomised evaluation of hot spots policing and increased municipal services in Bogotá 
(Colombia) found that intensifying either policing or municipal services alone had limited effects. 
City blocks that received both did see significant decreases in crime. However, property crime in 
particular appeared to be pushed onto neighbouring streets (Blattman et al. 2018).  
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In Brazil, a quasi-experimental study of a favela pacification strategy in Rio de Janeiro between 
2008 and 2015 that mixed elements of hot spots policing with a problem-oriented policing 
approach also found disappointing effects. Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) were assigned to 
provide a permanent increased police presence in favelas and to promote more positive relations 
with residents. The city introduced a “pay-for-performance” incentive scheme around the same 
time that paid rewards to all units in the city that were able to keep homicides, car theft, and 
street robberies below neighbourhood-specific thresholds. The study found little impact on 
homicides between inhabitants, but that the policies decreased police killings, accounting for 29 
fewer police killing incidents for every 100,000 people each year (Magaloni et al. 2015). 
Types and aims of interventions 
Faced with the ineffectiveness of tough law enforcement interventions, the Central American 
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have rolled out interventions, with the 
support of multilateral agencies, geared “at voluntary weapons collection, temporary firearms-
carrying restrictions and alcohol prohibitions, to environmental design in slums and targeted 
education and public health initiatives focusing on ‘at-risk youth’ and even single female-headed 
care-giving households” (Jütersonke et al. 2009:13). These so-called ‘second-generation 
interventions’, which are mostly geared toward violence reduction and only incorporate select 
elements of what would be called alternative livelihoods promotion projects like, for instance, job 
skills training or cash-for-work programmes,9 feature an evidence-led and ‘integrated’ approach 
to urban violence prevention and reduction. Because action plans tend to be formulated by 
municipal authorities and service-providers in concert with public and private security actors, 
academic institutions, and civil society, they can also unconsciously adopt a more participatory 
and intersectoral approach. […] At the level of practice, even where levels of financial investment 
in first-generation initiatives far surpass those being accorded to second-generation 
programmes, examples of the latter are […] being implemented in the region, particularly by 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies. Under the rubric of ‘citizen security’ and 
‘violence reduction’, the World Bank, the IADB, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Habitat Programme (UN-
HABITAT), the UN Office for Drug and Crime Control (UNODC) and others are invested in an 
array of activities designed to promote greater compliance and a focus on voluntary approaches 
to addressing urban violence and gangs. For example, the World Bank developed a Small 
Grants Programme for Violence Prevention (SGPVP) in 2005 as part of a wider crime and 
violence prevention initiative, which included a focus on gangs. In keeping with the second-
generation framework outlined above, the agency seeks to support ‘community-based’ and 
municipally driven approaches to reducing the availability of weapons and re-engineering the 
attitudes and behaviour of gangs who might use them” (Jütersonke et al. 2009:16). 
These interventions are informed by research on social and urban violence reduction and/or 
mitigation strategies. In this vein, Arevalo de León et al. highlight “policy approaches that focus 
on individual manifestations of violence are ineffective and do not contribute to an overall 
reduction of violence in society, especially if they are formulated in reaction to public perceptions 
based on sensationalism and exaggeration. Different expressions of violent cycles reinforce each 
other: repressive responses on the side of governmental agencies; violent imageries in society 
that foster self-help reactions such as vigilantism and lynching; domestic, gender and school 
violence that reinforces such violent imageries. All of them need to be addressed simultaneously 
and in a coordinated way in order to achieve effective and sustainable results” (Arevalo de León 
et al. 2016:15). According to the research conducted by Arevalo de León et al., “experience 
                                                   
9 Such alternative livelihoods-focused interventions have been implemented, for instance, in Afghanistan (a 
livelihood training programme and a one-time unconditional cash transfer programme for at-risk youth in 
Kandahar, Lyall et al. 2018)), Liberia (an intensive agricultural training programme for high-risk men, Blattman 
and Anan 2015) and Uganda (a cash-transfer programme for youth, Blattman, Fiala and Martinez 2014). 
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shows that civil society and community organisations such as churches, community associations, 
NGOs, academic centres and trade associations can fill the gap left by deficient state capacity 
and complement the state’s efforts in the design and implementation of operational strategies 
addressing insecurity, crime and violence. […] Genuine civil society organisations can provide 
additional inroads into a problem, as they can more effectively reach out to illicit actors than 
governmental institutions, and they can engage non-conventional actors constructively in the 
search for creative solutions” (Arevalo de León et al. 2016:18). 
International actors are also well placed to play an enabling and empowering role, supporting 
and facilitating coordination among all the different stakeholders. However, they should 
acknowledge that their interventions are neither neutral nor merely technical inasmuch as they 
respond to national or institutional interests. Their role should be discussed just as openly as that 
of any other stakeholder. External actors cannot be builders, but they can be enablers. They 
might understand the conceptual need for bridging but can only do it by supporting local actors 
who understand the need and lead the process – and who have been working to reduce violence 
well before international peacebuilders arrive (Arévalo de León et al. 2016). 
Effectiveness 
There is no solid evidence on the effectiveness of ‘second-generation’ interventions to curb 
urban gang violence in Central America. Although they have been credited with some modest 
successes, such as the establishment of ‘peace zones’ in San Salvador, which were negotiated 
between the government and gang leaders and brought a temporary decrease in homicides 
(Seelke 2014), more preventive second-generation interventions seem to have yielded more 
rhetorical advances than meaningful reductions in gang violence (Jütersonke et al. 2009). What 
is better known is that “contrary to their reported success in diminishing gang violence, 
repressive first-generation approaches have tended instead to radicalise gangs, potentially 
pushing them towards more organized forms of criminality. 
According to Jütersonke at al. (2009), “inevitably, hard-handed measures are frequently 
supported by the public, owing to the visibility such interventions afford. But, while official reports 
claim that anti-gang initiatives generate significant reductions in criminal violence, most evidence 
indicates that these effects are temporary and tenuous. Crackdown operations against gangs 
tend to generate perverse effects – including a greater predisposition to excessive acts of 
brutality and new forms of adaptation to avoid capture. Indeed, repressive tactics frequently 
encourage members to become more organized and violent, as is well illustrated by escalatory 
violence in Honduras in the wake of Mano Dura. Similar processes have been reported in El 
Salvador and Guatemala” (Jütersonke et al. 2009:12). In sum, “when it comes to outcomes, […] 
there is comparatively meagre evidence of effective impacts across time and space. Indeed, in 
the Central American countries that now long ago emerged from war, including Nicaragua, 
Guatemala and El Salvador, homicidal violence appears to be rising or remaining stable – 
sometimes equivalent to peak periods of armed conflict (Jütersonke et al. 2009:18). 
Regarding the alternative livelihoods-focused interventions in other fragile and violence and 
crime-affected developing countries, there have been few rigorous evaluations to date. While the 
existing evidence base suggests that employment and skills training programs may reduce 
criminal and violent activity, their effects are often modest and come at significant cost (Blattman 
and Ralston 2015). Programs that target the highest-risk individuals may be more cost-effective. 
But policymakers should be careful about assuming that employment or training programs will 
bring stability. Research in Liberia found that an agricultural skills training program, particularly 
when coupled with the promise of a future cash transfer, led former combatants to shift away 
from illicit activities (Blattman and Annan 2015). An evaluation in Afghanistan found that three- 
and six-month technical training programs improved economic outcomes modestly but failed to 
impact attitudes towards violence or willingness to engage in political violence (Mercy Corps 
2015); a follow-up study found a modest reduction in pro-Taliban sentiment where this training 
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was paired with a cash transfer (Lyall et al. 2018). Choosing between crime and licit employment 
is rarely an either/or decision in poorer, fragile settings, where many individuals engage in 
“portfolios” of work to mitigate risks. Vocational programs may help reduce their involvement in 
criminal or violent activities, but policymakers should not expect people to exit these activities 
entirely. 
6. Evidence gaps 
As shown in this Helpdesk report, overall the evidence on the types of alternative 
development/livelihoods programmes that address SOC and associated activities, such as illicit 
crop farming, in developing countries as well as the interventions that are used - and the 
effectiveness of such interventions - is very limited or non-existent. Where there is some 
evidence, it is not necessarily solid and tested. In part this is so because the main focus of policy 
addressing SOC is law enforcement-focused, not development-oriented. Thus, there are no 
discernible policies and programmes that would seek to tackle illegal drug production (processing 
and refining of plant-based or synthetic illegal drugs), drug trafficking, human trafficking and 
smuggling, illegal organ trade, gun running and cybercrime, among other types of serious and 
organised crime, by means of alternative livelihoods programmes. 
 
Regarding the AD and alternative livelihoods promotion programmes that have been referenced 
in this report, it is paramount to solidify the evidence base with respect to the causes and drivers 
of illicit crop farming, wildlife crime, piracy and urban gang violence. Furthermore, it is of 
importance to (a) develop useful indicators and metrics to measure the effectiveness of 
interventions in these fields - a big task that would require overcoming significant political and 
ideological hurdles in order to establish a broader consensus on the aims of drug and wildlife 
conservation policies; and (b) conduct rigorous outcome and impact evaluations of AD and 
alternative livelihoods promotion programmes, including with respect to piracy gang-related 
crime, thereby overcoming the limitations of current evaluations which focus on outputs, not 
outcomes and/or impact. Additional research is also needed to better understand non-material 
drivers of participation in crime and urban violence and what types of non-employment 
interventions are most effective in reducing crime and urban violence among highest risk men. In 
this respect, much remains to be done in terms of strengthening our understanding of gender 
issues in relation to both SOC in the developing world and alternative development/livelihoods 
interventions aimed at helping people and communities build a life outside harmful crime. 
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